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THEORIZING BALLISTICS:  
ETHICS, EMOTIONS, AND WEAPONS SCIENTISTS
JOANNA BOURKE
ABSTRACT
What is violence? This article explores conceptions of violence from the perspective of 
scientists engaged in weapons research. Ballistics scientists are routinely excluded from 
the “violent” label on grounds of class, status, education, and emotional comportment. 
The article analyzes the science of ballistics through the lenses of ethics and emotions. 
How do scientists justify experiments in ballistics, or the science of designing weapons 
and other technologies aimed at destroying environments and inflicting wounds (often 
fatal) and other forms of injury on people and nonhuman animals? In stark contrast to 
those who analyze weapons development as an objective science and who impart violent 
agency to autonomous technologies, I situate wound ballistics as a branch of applied moral 
philosophy. Its practice always involves an “ought.” Although the central job of ballistics 
scientists is the “effective production of wounds,” this is not regarded as violent, except 
by their victims, of course. In part, this lacuna is due to an ideological relationship forged 
between “violence” and particular emotional states. It is also part of a political project 
defining “the human.”
Keywords: violence, ballistics science, scientists, war, weapons, emotions, ethics, human, 
humanity
Ballistics science is a feminist issue. As the scientific discipline committed to 
devising and producing weapons aimed at destroying environments and sentient 
beings, ballistics research goes to the heart of what it means to be human, in all 
our fleshly vulnerability. An analysis of the practices of ballistics scientists also 
exposes some of the incongruities inherent in the concept of violence. What is 
“violence”? There is no easy answer: “violence” is constituted through discursive 
practices and configurations. Acts are designated “violent” through processes of 
classification and regulation, generated by a vast array of agents, including public 
commentators, politicians, lawmakers, military officers, and academics, to name 
just a few. It makes a difference who is entitled to label something as “violent,” 
which is why it matters that, for centuries, deciding whether an act is violent or 
not has been the task of white, middle- and upper-class men and their representa-
tives within political, judicial, scientific, and military institutions. When victims 
maintain that specific acts are “violent,” their claims are routinely disparaged, 
silenced, and suppressed. 
In this article, I turn to one group of people routinely excluded from the “vio-
lent” label on grounds of class, status, education, and emotional comportment: 
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that is, men (almost exclusively) who “go ballistic.” I am referring to ballistics 
scientists. When these highly educated professionals engage in war-work they 
have usually been deemed to be conducting acts of dispassionate research, rather 
than reveling in what are intrinsically violent provocations and practices. Their 
omission from the canon of violent individuals is no coincidence: it is an integral 
part of the necro-political complex.
In the spring and summer of 1947, a bad-tempered argument erupted in the pages 
of The American Scholar. It concerned the role of scientists in the development 
and production of weapons. The debate was sparked by a short article by Louis 
N. Ridenour, a professor of physics at the University of Pennsylvania who had 
spent the war conducting military research on radiation and radar. The article and 
the eleven responses that followed were entitled “Should the Scientists Resist 
Military Intrusion?” Later that year, these essays were republished in the Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists under the headline “Military Support of American 
Science, A Danger?”1 
The Second World War had ended two years earlier, but Ridenour argued 
that continued military funding of research in weapons design was not only 
financially necessary but intellectually beneficial as well. The armed services, 
he claimed, were “fulfilling a public responsibility in supporting disinterested 
scientific research” and were careful not to “intrude” in decisions made within 
laboratories. He lambasted scientists who believed that any research that aided 
the armed forces was “ipso facto reprehensible.” This was a ridiculous position, 
he fumed, and would lead to “logical absurdities.” For example, was it “moral to 
pay federal taxes, when so large a fraction of the money so collected goes into 
maintaining the Armed Forces?” And what about starting a family? After all, “If 
a man begets children, and one of them is male, and there is a war, and this son 
is a soldier, sailor or airman, then he may kill others.” Does this mean that a man 
should “forego procreation?”2
Ridenour challenged scientists who possessed misgivings against weapons 
research to simply refuse to conduct such research. They were not being forced to 
accept the money, he insisted, contending that “seduction is involved, not rape.” 
The important “moral issue,” Ridenour continued, was not what type of weapons 
were invented by scientists and then employed in armed conflicts but “whether 
a war be fought at all.” After all, “God told Moses not to kill; in no way did he 
indicate that one form of killing is less moral than another.” Ridenour urged sci-
entist-citizens to “concentrate on [eliminating] war, and forget about the tools”: 
in other words, they should not fret about their role in designing weapons aimed 
at maiming and killing fellow humans. It was important not to “confuse the rather 
minor matter of weapons design with the basic and tremendous immorality of 
war.” Scientists had done a grand job in designing weapons during the 1939–45 
conflict: now was not the time to develop scruples.3
1. Louis N. Ridenour, “Should the Scientists Resist Military Intrusion?,” American Scholar 16, no. 
2 (1947), 213-218. Also published as “Military Support of American Science, A Danger?,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists (August 1947), 221-223.
2. Ridenour, “Should the Scientists Resist Military Intrusion?,” 216-217.
3. Ibid., 217. 
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Respondents to Ridenour’s article were divided, but the most revealing reac-
tions came from his critics. They presented a significantly more hostile perspec-
tive on the relationship between science and weapons design. Vannevar Bush, 
who had been director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD) since 1941, noted that the “great emphasis on applied research” (that is, 
weapons development) was “natural and proper” during wartime but should be 
abandoned in times of peace.4 Philip Morrison, a physics professor from Cornell 
University who had worked with the Chicago and Los Alamos laboratories dur-
ing the Manhattan Project, accused the military of using science with “crass 
inhumanity.” He pleaded with scientists to pursue “truth for all men, not for 
Americans alone.”5 Mathematician Norbert Wiener also urged scientists to dis-
tance themselves from the military. He noted that “the Armed Services are not fit 
almoners for education and science. They are run by men whose chief purpose in 
life is war, and to whom the absence of war . . . is a frustration and denial of the 
purpose of their existence.” Being paid by them was “fatal to the moral responsi-
bility of the individual scientist.”6 
The most powerful riposte, though, came from sociologist Robert K. Merton. 
He sneered at Ridenour’s naiveté, especially his belief that scientists could refuse 
“to be seduced into a life of secrecy by the munificent military” and would 
therefore “enjoy complete safety from rape by the men in uniform.” Merton 
even accused scientists tempted by military grants of being prostitutes whose 
“behaviour testifies that eventually they would have given way to temptation.” 
Weapon’s research was a dishonorable task for scientists, and, Merton main-
tained, Ridenour’s portrayal of a “disinterested, self-denying, unintrusive, pros-
perous, munificent and communicative military” was absurd.7 
This heated exchange exemplifies some of the themes explored in this article. 
First, none of these commentators explicitly linked scientific war-work with 
real violence against sentient humans: the visceral, bloody consequences of 
their research were silenced by them all, irrespective of whether they supported 
or railed against Ridenour’s pro-military stance. Second, with the exception of 
Merton, all of the commentators had been implicated in weapons development 
during the Second World War, yet they uniformly sought to position themselves 
as members of a disinterested and dispassionate elite. They presented themselves 
as men who not only possessed unique, specialist knowledge, but were also 
unaffected by political or personal emotions. Although committed to the task of 
fighting Axis militarism, each of these scientists claimed to adhere to an inter-
nationalist view of “humanity” and its corollary ethical attitude, the “humane.” 
Their disagreement focused solely on the role of weapons research in peacetime. 
4. Vannevar Bush, no title, American Scholar 16, no. 2 (1947), 219-220. Also published in the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August 1947), 228.
5. Philip Morrison, no title, American Scholar 16, no. 2 ( 1947), 218-219. Also published in the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August 1947), 224.
6. Norbert Wiener, no title, American Scholar 16, no. 2 (spring 1947), 220-21. Also published in 
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August 1947), 228.
7. Robert K. Merton, no title, American Scholar 16, no. 3 (1947), 356-357. Also published in the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August 1947), 225.
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In contrast, in this article I argue that discourses of “humanity” (both as ontol-
ogy and moral attitude) are at the heart of the ideology and practice of ballistics 
science. I explore the regimes of normativity that develop within a discipline 
dedicated to the task of destroying “the human,” yet whose members are not des-
ignated “men of violence.” In other words, while ballistics scientists are heavily 
implicated in the major forms of wounding and killing in modern history, they 
have been excluded from the negative category of “violent.” When defined in 
terms of interpersonal acts, the verb “violent” is applied to certain nonhuman 
animals, working-class criminals, combatant soldiers, and overly emotional mili-
tarists (to take just four examples), but not to affluent scientists responsible for 
weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, their instrumental violence is highly 
valued, lucrative, and valorized by elites within Anglo-European societies. 
I will be analyzing the science of ballistics through the two lenses provided by 
Ridenour and his respondents: ethics and emotions. Both these frameworks (and 
I do not claim they are the only ones) are implicated in the inability to see the 
violence of ballistics scientists. First, historians need to be critical ethicists, refus-
ing to accept the self-representation of ballistics scientists. I argue that scientists 
engaged in ballistics research are moral agents, making normative judgments 
about the ontological status of sentient beings. This includes judgments about life 
and death. These judgments should be seen as intrinsically violent. Second, the 
“violent” label is associated with a particular kind of emotionality (“hot”) and 
expressive demeanor (belligerent). In contrast, scientists position themselves as 
“cool” and analytical. I argue that ballistics scientists are enmeshed in emotional 
communities. Mathematical precision, chemical formulas, and an abiding con-
cern with reproducibility seek to disguise the emotionality at the core of their 
discipline. Although this article will focus solely on the scientists themselves, it 
decenters their rhetoric by implicit acknowledgment of their victims: it seeks to 
put violence and the abject body back into ballistics science. This is why ballistics 
should concern feminists.
The term “ballistics” comes from the Greek “ballein,” meaning “to throw so as 
to hit.” As a fairly recent scientific discipline, it is typically divided into three 
branches: interior, external, and wound ballistics.8 Interior ballistics concerns 
itself with the inner mechanism of weapons (including barrels, armor systems, 
sights, muzzle attachments, systems technologies, and so on); external ballistics 
focuses on the effects of wind, velocity, gravity, and drag on the projectile in 
flight; and wound (also, chillingly, known as terminal) ballistics is the study of 
what happens when the missile hits its “target.” The science of ballistics, there-
fore, involves designing weapons and other technologies aimed at destroying 
environments and inflicting wounds (often fatal) and other forms of debilita-
tion (including psychological) on people and nonhuman animals. In the period 
explored in this article, scientists engaged in weapons research usually possessed 
expertise in physics, chemistry, metallurgy, mathematics, electrical and mechani-
cal engineering, computing, and biology. As zoologist Solly Zuckerman (later, 
8. Less frequently, some commentators also add intermediate ballistics, or the behavior of projec-
tiles as the projectile leaves the barrel.
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Lord Zuckerman: Britain’s most prominent pioneer of “operational research” in 
the 1940s) proudly claimed, they were “professional students of destruction.”9
Although the scientists I will be discussing conducted their weapons research 
in the UK and US between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries, it 
is no coincidence that I started this article with the Second World War. That war 
was a crucial period for ballistics science, seeing not only unprecedented military 
activity by scientists but also transforming the dynamic between professional and 
“lay” weapons researchers. Science itself (as opposed to a specialist branch of 
science) became fully militarized from the late 1930s, heralding a revolution in 
military affairs. Indeed, none of the scientists responding to Ridenour’s article in 
1947 would have considered themselves to be full-time ballistics scientists. They 
engaged in weapons research because of the international emergency occasioned 
by Axis aggression. They probably would have argued that they produced forms 
of militarized knowledge that were intrinsically ethical because of a specific his-
torical context, that is, global war. 
This insistence on the contextual specificity of scientific research in weapons 
design and production sits uneasily with their simultaneous naturalization of mili-
taristic violence. These scientists routinely situated their task as part of a timeless 
trajectory of what it means to be human, at least for the masculine gender. In a 
typical statement, published in the classic text Wound Ballistics, Major Ralph W. 
French and Brigadier-General George R. Callender maintained that “analytical 
retrospective of the entire development of warfare from prehistoric time” onward 
reveals “man’s continual struggle to augment his human capacity to inflict injury 
through the utilization of the law of kinetic energy as applied to the moving 
object.”10 In other words, they contended not only that ballistics science was 
objective, rational, and concerned with falsifiable hypotheses, but they also natu-
ralized and universalized violence as part of “man’s” nature. This enabled them 
to sidestep ethical debates about the conditions under which wounding and killing 
was (or was not) morally justified.
When ethical issues did arise, distinctions were made between times of war and 
peace. This was the point made by many of Ridenour’s critics. The most pressing 
of these issues was the appropriate “medium” for experimentation. In the absence 
of battlefield action, ballistics scientists lamented the dearth of human subjects 
on which they could explore the “wounding effectiveness” of their weapons.11 
They were required to develop alternative mediums with which to “standardize 
the production” of “wound events.” Substitutes for human and nonhuman bod-
ies included water, plasticine, clay, blocks of gelatin, glycerine soap, silicon, 
synthetic fibres, leather, latex, and pine boards (dubbed “Zuckerman soldiers”). 
9. Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords: The Autobiography (1904–1946) of Solly Zuckerman 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 334.
10. Major Ralph W. French and Brigadier-General George R. Callender, “Physical Aspects of the 
Missile Casualty,” in Wound Ballistics, ed. Lieutenant-Colonel Leonard D. Heaton (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the U.S. Army, 1962), 92. 
11. Gwilym G. Davis, “The Effects of Small Calibre Bullets as Used in Military Arms,” Annals of 
Surgery 25, no. 1 (January 1897), 36. 
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In more recent decades, “biomechanical models” (such as the “Computer Man”) 
were employed.12 Such forms of modeling were violent only in symbolic realms.
Less abstract forms of violence occurred when ballistics scientists tested their 
weapons on the sentient, anesthetized, and dead bodies of nonhuman animals. In 
1899, rifle and bullet researcher Henry G. Beyer boasted that his experimental 
subjects were freshly killed animals, still “perfectly fresh” and “warm” when 
delivered to his laboratory from the local abattoir.13 At other research facilities, 
scientists preferred anesthetizing their animals prior to weapons testing, debat-
ing only how much anesthetic should be given to animals before they were 
“sacrificed.”14 Still other scientists (including Zuckerman) believed that only 
fully sentient animals would suffice. He experimented using living and fully 
sentient monkeys and goats.15
The “gold standard” of testing, though, involved human subjects. War itself 
provided many opportunities: as distinguished physician Henry K. Beecher 
bragged during the Second World War, battle meant that there was “an abun-
dance of material” at the “active fronts.”16 Here, debates about gradations of 
humanity and its related ethical attitude (the “humane”) were glaringly revealed. 
Weapons designers explicitly argued that certain weapons were legitimate when 
employed against “savages,” but were cruel in conflicts between “civilized” 
peoples. In imperial conquests, for instance, the enemy was “fair game.” This 
was why missiles that had been designed to kill the “charging tiger, elephant, or 
buffalo” were essential in armed conflicts against a “fierce and tiger-like” human 
enemy, according to one late-nineteenth-century ballistics expert.17 Ballistics 
developers need not hold any scruples in developing weapons that were intrinsi-
cally vicious, because “savages” either did not fully feel pain or were set outside 
the international conventions against unnecessarily cruel punishments. In the 
words of Surgeon-Colonel William Flack Stevenson in his 1898 report on the 
need to develop bullets with greater “stopping power,”
the fanatical Asiatic knows nothing of [international] congresses, and would only laugh at 
the suggestion of waging war on such principles. All his efforts are directed towards caus-
ing the greatest possible injury to his enemy, and he fully expects his enemy to do likewise 
by him. No purely humanitarian sentiments, therefore, need interfere with the use of bul-
lets of a destructive nature by civilised nations when at war with people of this class.18 
12. V. Clare, W. Ashman, P. Broome, J. Jameson, J. Lewis, J. Merkler, A. Mickiewicz, W. Sacco, 
and L. Sturdivan, “Computer Man Simulation of Incapacitation: An Automated Approach to Wound 
Ballistics and Associated Medical Care Assessments,” Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on 
Computer Application in Medical Care 4 (November 1981), 1009-1013.
13. Henry G. Beyer, “Observations on the Effects Produced by the 6-mm Rifle and Projectile—
Experimental Study,” Journal of the Boston Society of Medical Sciences 3, no. 5 (January 1899), 126.
14. For example, see Major F. P. Thoresby, “Armalite Rifle (AR15) Wound Ballistics Trials,” 
Porton Technical Paper No. 904, Secret—Discreet, 1964, np, in The National Archives (UK), WO 
189/160.
15. Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords, and Solly Zuckerman and A. N. Black, “The Effect of 
Impacts on the Head and Backs of Monkeys,” typescript, August 1940, SZ/OEMU/8/3/18.
16. Letter from Henry Beecher to A. N. Richards, October 16, 1942, in Folder 10, Papers of Walter 
B. Cannon, Countway Medical Library, Boston.
17. Alex Ogston, “Continental Criticism of English Rifle Bullets,” British Medical Journal (March 
25, 1899), 752.
18. Surgeon-Colonel William Flack Stevenson, “Statement on the General Question of the 
‘Stopping Power’ of Modern Small-Bore Bullets,” 25-6 [p. 39-40 of file], in The National Archives 
(London) WO 32/7055.
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Writing from the 1899 Peace Conference, army surgeon Frederick George 
Engelbach made a similar argument, based largely on the reduced sentience of 
a “savage” enemy. What can be done, he concluded, “with a gallant fanatic who 
actually wriggles up the lance of his enemy to slay before his exhausted muscles 
give out?”19 The Director-General of the Indian Medical Service put it more 
evocatively: a “fanatical Ghazi,” he judged, “was not checked by the modern 
bullet, which went through him like a knitting needle through a pot of butter.”20 
They were advocating the use of soft-point or dum-dum bullets, which inflicted 
devastating wounds.
The violence of such discussions between munitions scientists is transparent: 
their language is vehement, brutal, and passionate. Such rhetoric was dramati-
cally muted when these scientists discussed weapons designed for fighting “civi-
lized” nations. In such cases, a mathematical logic was typically adopted, but 
that should not mask their equally violent intent. Instead of discussing the need 
to intensify the suffering of certain groups of people, ballistics scientists turned 
to more abstract formulations such as SCRs and SKRs, that is, Standardized 
Casualty and Killing Rates. Devised by Zuckerman and statistician Frank Yates, 
these rates are based on a population density of one person per thousand square 
feet (or 92.9 square meters) in the area at risk. For example, they calculated 
that when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the “vulnerable area for 
the killed was 2.85 square miles, and for all casualties 9.36 square miles. This 
gave a SKR of 79,450 and an SCR of 260,900.” They also developed “indexes 
of wounding capacity” in their attempt to discover how “the desired wounding 
effect could be achieved.”21 In 1977, the author of “Wound Ballistics” added that 
in calculating an “index of wounding capacity” it was helpful to know the “level 
of energy absorption at a tissue depth of 15 cm . . . as this is the depth at which 
most vital structures lie.”22 The ability of these scientists to convert multiple 
observations into abstract formulas won them prestige, but also served to mask 
the violence involved in calculating how to ensure this “desired wounding.”
Of course, the ballistics value of using human bodies to calculate how to inflict 
suffering did not occur only in wartime. In peacetime, human cadavers were 
“harvested” from poor-law institutions and pauper hospitals: these marginalized 
bodies, unmourned by relatives or friends, could be further set outside the com-
munity of “fully human” by ballistics experimentation.23 
A cavalier attitude to consent was also common when living humans were used. 
This was most egregious when American scientists made use of Nazi experimental 
19. Frederick George Engelbach, “A Plea for the Dum-Dum,” Daily Mail (June 12, 1899), 4.
20. Comment by the Surgeon-General Harvey (Director-General of the Indian Medical Service), in 
discussion after the lecture by William MacCormac, “Some Remarks, By Way of Contrast, On War 
Surgery, Old and New,” British Medical Journal 2, no. 2121 (1901), 462.
21. A. A. Liebow, “Encounter with Disaster: A Medical Diary of Hiroshima, 1945,” Yale Journal 
of Biology and Medicine 56, no. 1 (1983), 235. Also see Wilfrid Edward Le Gros Clark, “The 
Contribution of Anatomy to the War,” British Medical Journal (January 12, 1946), 40, and Charles 
N. Bressel, “Expected Target Damage for Pattern Firing,” Operations Research 19, no. 3 (1971), 655.
22. J. Wilson, “Wound Ballistics,” West Journal of Medicine 127 (July 1977), 51.
23. Colonel Louis Anatole LaGarde, Gunshot Injuries: How They Are Inflicted, Their 
Complications, and Treatment (New York: William Wood and Co., 1914), 417.
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“data” after the Holocaust.24 But such carelessness can be traced in other research 
facilities as well. Take, for example, chemical warfare experiments carried out 
in both British and American laboratories during wartime. A particularly reveal-
ing account was given in 1946 by Harry Cullumbine, head of the Physiological 
Section at the Chemical Defence Experimental Station at Porton Down. He had 
been conducting tests of lacrimators (weeping agents), sternutators (sneezing 
agents), and “vesicant” (blistering) compounds, such as mustard gas.25 Although 
Cullumbine claimed that “all the subjects were volunteers,” this was disputed by 
the chemist George Box, who worked as a lab assistant there. Box recalled that 
when testing liquid mustard gas on soldiers, everyone had to “sign off on a line 
that said ‘All informed,’ but I’m afraid this protocol was not followed.” He noted 
that “Cullumbine . . . was kept very busy by the misuse of these samples.”26 An 
independent ethics committee was established at Porton Down only in 1988.27
So, how did ballistics scientists justify conducting research intended to harm 
other people? One important way was to establish boundaries, particularly 
between themselves as “innocent” or “pure” scientists and “guilty” military men. 
When criticized, ballistics scientists routinely responded by arguing that they 
could not control the way their inventions (conveniently not called “weapons”) 
were employed. Even Louis F. Fieser, when asked about his ethical responsibility 
for inventing napalm, maintained that “I have no right to judge the morality of 
napalm just because I invented it.” When questioned about its use during the war 
in Vietnam, he claimed that “You don’t know what’s coming. I was working on 
a technical problem that was considered pressing.”28
Others abnegated responsibility for the intrinsically violent nature of their 
work by claiming dual use. In the words of Cullumbine, the “offensive tests” 
(that is, experiments that seek to develop the most devastating chemical weapons) 
were a “necessary preliminary to experiments designed to evaluate protective 
measures and equipment; the possible hazards had first to be determined before 
methods of defence could be formulated.”29 
However, the relative weight of humanitarian versus antihumanitarian values 
was summed up by French and Callender in Wound Ballistics (1962). After genu-
flecting toward the humanitarian goals behind ballistics research (that is, such 
knowledge will help medical officers treat the wounded), they quickly turned 
to its darker goals. “This knowledge,” they bragged, “permits the design of ord-
nance material for antipersonnel purposes on scientific grounds.” It “also lessens 
24. For a discussion, see Benna Müller-Hill, “The Silence of the Scholars,” in Dark Medicine: 
Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research, ed. William R. LaFleur, Gernot Böhme, and Susumu 
Shimazono (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 57-62.
25. Harry Cullumbine, “Chemical Warfare Experiment Using Human Subjects,” British Medical 
Journal 2, no. 4476 (1946), 577.
26. George E. P. Box, An Accidental Statistician: The Life and Memories of George E. P. Box 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2013), 29.
27. Hugh Dudley, “Tests on Volunteers at Porton Down,” British Medical Journal 309 (November 
26, 1949), 1443.
28. “The Man Who Invented Napalm,” Time (January 8, 1968), 33.
29. Cullumbine, “Chemical Warfare Experiment Using Human Subjects,” 578.
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the need for costly rule-of-thumb or ‘cut and try’ methods by either the military 
surgeon or the ordnance engineer.”30 The “fog of war” would be dispelled.
Scientists used another tactic to justify ballistics research: relativism. Cruelty 
was “comparative”; pain could be calibrated. As Ridenour put it at the begin-
ning of this article, “God told Moses not to kill; in no way did he indicate that 
one form of killing is less moral than another.”31 They asked: were the wounds 
inflicted by hollow-point bullets actually more agonizing than those caused by 
the Snide or Martini-Henry?32 Was it really more terrible to be burned alive with 
napalm than with conventional fire? Was drowning worse than dismembering? 
For example, Surgeon-Major-General J. B. Hamilton defended the development 
and employment of dum-dum bullets on the grounds that there were worse ways 
to die. He observed that an admiral in command of a fleet would never “hesitate 
to ‘ram’ a battleship or blow her up with a torpedo, destroying perhaps 800 men 
in the operation.” Indeed, he exclaimed, such an admiral would “gain renown for 
the action; but if our War Office uses a projectile calculated to ‘stop’ individuals, 
it is condemned as ‘inhumane’!” He reminded readers that “war cannot be made 
with rosewater.”33 
Ballistics scientists could even be heard arguing that certain types of violence 
were “humanitarian.” Again, this was Hamilton’s point. Using the euphemistic 
term “setting up” to refer to what happens when a bullet penetrates human flesh, 
he noted that “If the Dum-dum bullet be used, it, as a rule, will injure but one man, 
as when ‘set up,’ its power of penetration rapidly ceases; if, on the other hand, a 
projectile entirely covered with nickel be employed, it will possibly pass through 
two or three men, and gradually ‘setting up,’ inflict greater injuries on a fourth.”34
In his article entitled “How To Fight Savage Tribes,” Elbridge Colby similarly 
argued that the mass slaughter involved in dropping a bomb on a village was 
“actually humane” because it would shorten the conflict and thus prevent “the 
shedding of more excessive quantities of blood.”35 
It was a calculus perfected by humanitarian organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross from the late twentieth century, 
who devised the Wound Classification System and SIrUS Project (Superfluous 
Injury or Unnecessary Suffering Project). The formula’s proponents boasted 
that it provided an “objective” way of judging wounds. The number and size of 
wounds were measured; fractures, recorded; injuries to vital structures, noted; 
the presence of metallic bodies, counted; and the length of time spent in hospital, 
30. Major Ralph W. French and Brigadier-General George R. Callender, “Physical Aspects of the 
Missile Casualty,” in Heaton, ed., Wound Ballistics, 93.
31. Ridenour, “Should the Scientists Resist Military Intrusion?,” 218. 
32. For an extended discussion, see Surgeon-Colonel W. F. Stevenson, “The Effects of the Dum-
Dum Bullet from a Surgical Point of View,” British Medical Journal (May 21, 1898), 1324-1325; 
“The Peace Conference,” British Medical Journal (June 10, 1899), 1420; “The Text-Book for 
Military Small Arms and Ammunition 1894,” Quarterly Review 190 (July 1899), 174-175.
33. Surgeon-Major-General J. B. Hamilton, “The Dum-Dum Bullet,” British Medical Journal 
(June 11, 1898), 1559.
34. Ibid. 
35. Elbridge Colby, “How to Fight Savage Tribes,” American Journal of International Law 21 
(1927), 279-281, 284-285, and 287. 
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assessed.36 Although the benevolent motives of those experts who devised such 
codification practices is unquestioned, the procedure actually serves a political 
function in justifying certain technologies designed to maim and kill. Even pro-
ponents of SIrUS argue that conventional weapons do not violate the criteria for 
“superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” In other words, both the Wound 
Classification System and SIrUS establish a hierarchy by which certain weapons 
designed to maim and kill people are acceptable. It reproduces an ethic willing 
to minimize, not eradicate, certain forms of violence. As the first sentence of an 
article on the Wound Classification System states, the “use of weapons by human 
beings to inflict physical harm on each other is an integral part of our heritage, 
and likely predates the development of speech.”37 Such assumptions return us to 
the universalistic discourses of ballistics specialists such as French and Callender.
To a large degree, these justificatory performances are ideological. But they are 
also shaped by beliefs about the value of sacrificing personal preferences in the 
interest of scientific progress. I can illustrate this point by turning to the promi-
nent chemist Louis Fieser. During the Second World War, Fieser specialized in 
developing incendiary devices. He was also the inventor of napalm. In his memoir, 
however, he complained that, in 1941, he had been “instructed to terminate work on 
explosives and to work instead on poison gases, vesicants.” The reassignment “did 
not please me,” he recalled, because he “doubted very much that vesicants would 
be used in the war,” he “would much prefer to work on something of practical value 
to the war effort.” Equally important, he maintained that “use of poison gas seemed 
to me inhumane.” In the end, however, “I swallowed my personal feelings and 
engaged a new group of men to start research on vesicants.”38 His concerns about 
the “inhumanity” of poisonous gases sit uneasily next to his lack of concern about 
burning people to death by fire and napalm (water boils at 100 degrees Celsius 
while napalm generates temperatures of 800 to 1,000 degrees). Indeed, in his mem-
oir, he is extremely proud of the fact that the millions of “Napalm-filled M-69s . . 
. scored a high record of success in the bombing of Germany” and had a “superb 
record of success in the Pacific Theatre of Operations” as well.39 By the end of the 
war, he claimed that “production of Napalm thickener had reaches a scale of about 
75 million pounds a year” and “approximately 30,000,000 M-69 bombs had been 
produced.”40 He also remarked that although his scientific group had not adapted 
napalm for use in flame throwers, it was nevertheless “gratifying to us to learn” that 
other scientists had “found this particular gel ideally applicable” to “deliver[]” this 
“burning fuel . . . onto a distant target.”41
36. See Robin M. Coupland, “The Red Cross Classification of War Wounds: The E.X.C.F.V.M. 
Scoring System,” World Journal of Surgery 16 (1992), and ICRS, SIrUS Project: Toward a 
Determination of Which Weapons Cause “Superfluous Injury or Unncessary Suffering,” ed. Robin 
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Such cognitive dissonance is typical. Another example could be the scientists 
at the Wound Ballistics Research Group who, during the Second World War, 
were responsible for placing wound ballistics “on a sound quantitative basis.”42 
Physiologist Edmund Newton Harvey and neurophysiologist John Farquhar 
Fulton were prominent members of this group. Historians writing their memoirs 
and obituaries ignored their violence. Harvey was described as having a “pensive, 
almost poetic expression,” and also of being a man with a “keen sense of ethics, 
a solid integrity, impeccable taste, and a dignified sense of humor.”43 Fulton was 
passionate about the pacifist writer Leo Tolstoy and was said to be “the foremost 
exponent of a union of medicine and the humanities, science, and history.” He 
was also a gastronome and the founder of a major humanities library. As an 
admirer maintained in 1956, Fulton exuded a “humanistic approach” in his ballis-
tics research and had the “satisfaction of indirect assuagement of human needs.” 
He added that: “Like the father of daughters, his contributions will be found even 
where his name may not be known.”44 Inherent in such logic is the violent erasure 
of women as well.
The disconnect between the white-coated scientists working in prestigious lab-
oratories and their “outputs” (weapons designed to harm others) is compounded 
by the obvious pleasure they take in their work. The emotional register of bal-
listics scientists is important in understanding why the designation “violent” is 
so rarely applied to them. In her chapter entitled “Experimental Injury: Wound 
Ballistics and Aviation Medicine in Mid-Century America,” historian Susan 
Lindee argues that weapons scientists exemplified rational neutrality and the 
erasure of emotions.45 This is misleading. Although ballistics scientists cast their 
findings in the abstract languages of mathematics and chemistry, the emotional 
register is evident in their drive to mastery and competence, their pride in belong-
ing to an elite group, and their delight when successfully completing a set of 
experiments. It is not necessary to appeal to their letters and diaries—the “private 
self”—to explore the emotions of ballistics science since the scientific self is also 
a feeling self. The most heralded trait of scientists—“objectivity”—is itself an 
emotion involving a feeling of restraint and a striving for repetition. 
The emotional economy of science takes a number of forms. First, the act of 
creating weapons elicits emotional conventions, including a disdain of “hot” lan-
guage and a cultivation of composure. Second, emotional communities are forged 
through relationships with other scientists. The practice as well as the production 
of ballistics science is fundamentally social. Of course, there is a strong gender 
element to these social communities. For example, Fieser’s wife, Mary, was a 
chemist and co-producer of his incendiary projects, but she was never identified 
42. E. Newton Harvey, J. Howard McMullen, Elmer G. Butler, and William O. Puckett, 
“Mechanism of Wounding,” in Heaton, ed.,Wound Ballistics, 146.
43. Frank H. Johnson, Edmund Newton Harvey 1887–1959: A Biographical Memoir (Washington, 
DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1967), 194 and 198.
44. Hebbel E. Hoff, “The Laboratory of Physiology,” Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 28 
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45. Susan Lindee, “Experimental Injury: Wound Ballistics and Aviation Medicine in Mid-Century 
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as a ballistics expert either at the time or since.46 Irrespective of the existence of 
women in the laboratories, it was a very male project.
Third, ballistics scientists pay attention to the emotions of their victims. On 
the one hand, they are encouraged to view their victims as abstract formulas or 
in the form of the universal, immaterial “Computer Man.” The pixeled computer 
screen also blurs the distinction between the life of the sentient body and the 
abstract one: biological and simulated existence becomes interchangeable. On the 
other hand, they are aware that their weapons needed to be noisy and awesome, 
as well as deadly, in order to incite terror in victims. Even Winston Churchill 
was aware that spreading “lively terror” was important to the British invasion of 
Mesopotamia (now Iraq) in 1919. It was this “moral effect” that would “cause 
great inconvenience” and enable them to achieve their goals, he maintained.47 
This “moral” effect of weapons design was often viewed as varying by culture. 
This has a strong racist undertone. For example, in his influential The Reformation 
of War (1923), Colonel J. F. C. Fuller claimed that “uncivilized” societies were 
“like the organism of the lower animals” in that they were “controlled by a series 
of nervous ganglia rather than a centralized brain.” As a consequence, 
in small wars against uncivilized nations, the form of warfare to be adopted must tone 
[sic] with the shade of culture existing in the land, by which I mean that against peoples 
possessing a low civilization, war must be more brutal in type (not necessarily in execu-
tion) than against a highly civilized nation; consequently, physical blows are more likely 
to prove effective than nervous shocks.48 
In other words, when fighting an “uncivilized” foe, weapons needed to be bolder 
and more brutal in order to produce the desired terror. Spectacle was paramount, 
particularly the awesome assault on the senses of touch, sight, smell, and sound.
Fourth, ballistics scientists were sensitive to the aesthetics of their designs, 
admitting to responding emotionally to balance and beauty. The pleasures of 
harmoniously designed weapons were told in over-blown, breathless, and vivid 
language. The techno-aesthetics of weapons design was enhanced by scien-
tific visualization. Ballistics scientists were keen to use photography because it 
showed the “awesome” path of the bullet moving through its “medium” (that is, a 
substitute for human flesh). Through photography, the very “essence” of violence 
could be tracked, captured, measured, replicated, and analyzed. 
There was also aesthetic pleasure to be had in witnessing destruction: the 
trajectory, spin, and “yaw” of a projectile, for instance. An example of this can 
be found in Lionel F. West’s theory of wound ballistics, developed during the 
First World War. Drawing on A. M. Worthington’s A Study of Splashes, West 
argued that there was a close comparison between splashes made by rainwater 
or spilled milk and those made when a projectile penetrated a human being. For 
46. Fieser, The Scientific Method, 13-14 and 101. See Stacey Pramer, “Mary Fieser: A Transitional 
Figure in the History of Women,” Journal of Chemical Education 62, no. 3 (1985), 186-191, which 
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47. Churchill Papers, 16/16, May 12, 1919, cited in Derek Gregory, “In Another Time-Zone, the 
Bombs Fall Unsafely . . .: Targets, Civilians, and Late Modern War,” The Arab World Geographer 
9, no. 2 (2006), 91.
48. Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1923), 191.
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him, wounds were like a “splash.” As when milk was spilled, when a bullet enters 
human tissue, there is a “bubble stage,” then the “thickening ring of upraised 
tissues will . . . break or tend to break into fragments or ‘drops’.” The bullet 
might “spin, wobble, or trip over itself at any velocity or angle” (and therefore 
the “splash” will be “rough”) but the “general phenomena . . . will, considered 
generally, be the same.”49
This blithe comparison of spilled milk and shattered tissue and bone encour-
ages a kind of cognitive forgetfulness about the violent function of weapons. 
It is extremely common in ballistics literature. Ballistics experts talk about the 
“production of the wound”50 or “producing the casualty”51 as though mortal com-
bat were some kind of industrialized assembly line. Hollow-pointed bullets were 
presented as simply being allowed to “‘set up’ on impact.”52 When such bullets 
hit a person, they “burr” before opening backwards.53 The explosive effects of 
high-velocity missiles is described as being “disruptive.”54 Objects are described 
as being “wounded” while “kill probability models” are based on “round lethal-
ity on tank functionality” rather than the humans inside the tanks.55 Fieser called 
napalm “apple sauce”56; it was a “flak suppression weapon,” rather than a human-
suppressor.57 
Indeed, as I argue in Wounding the World, the leading analogies to wounding 
in the ballistics literature are water and snow.58 Wound ballistics is described as 
“a branch of underwater ballistics,”59 and damage to human tissues is described as 
similar to “the stream of water from a fire hose.”60 In 1941, when Zuckerman and 
his co-authors described a bullet entering a human body, they observed that when 
“the ball enters the target a tail splash develops.”61 This was also the language 
used by Harvey. Writing in 1948, he observed that: 
49. Lionel F. West, “The Cause of the Divulsive Effect of Projectiles,” British Medical Journal 
1, no. 2873 (1916), 148. See A. M. Worthington’s A Study of Splashes (London: Longman, Green, 
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[w]hat happens with low velocity can be illustrated by thrusting a pointed rod into snow. 
The ice crystals are pushed ahead and move gently to one side leaving a track, perhaps 
somewhat larger than the rod, but with no effects at a distance. The high velocity missile, 
on the other hand, not only imparts momentum to material in front but also to material at 
the side, so that a great cavity is formed. . . . The effect can best be described as explo-
sive.62
In the words of another ballistics expert, if a diver “chooses a ‘cannonball’ 
dive, he will create a larger splash immediately on entering the water. This is 
similar to a missile that assumes a larger diameter (‘mushrooms’ or doing a 
‘bellywooper’) when coming into contact with tissue.”63 Such analogies are 
important: they exchange the messy, sticky bloodiness of actual wounding (not to 
mention the agonized victim) for a clean, gentle image of water or snow. 
The removal of violence from the weapons designer is also achieved by giving 
agency to the weapon itself. Indeed, the term “terminal ballistics” is frequently 
described as the “behavior of the missile in tissue,” as though a missile is capable 
of “behaving” one way or another.64 Ballistics science itself is defined as a kind 
of “bullet–body interaction” in which there is an “exchange” of energy.65 In 
such ways, the victim’s flesh is portrayed as an active partner in the interactive 
wounding process: her body participates in “exchanging” energy with the missile. 
According to this way of speaking, weapons possess emotions. “Violent” weap-
ons are those that are wielded in a particular manner: they could be “angry,” 
“hot,” and “intimate” or “instrumental” (“cool,” “dispassionate,” and “long-
distance”). From this point of view, aggressive weapons are those wielded by 
the technological “have-nots” rather than those used by high-tech states. In other 
words, in ballistics narratives, weapons are deeply enmeshed in individual social 
relations (they interact with the bodies of victims and have emotional reactions 
to those victims), but they are curiously abstracted from wider political relations. 
The weapons, rather than their designers, act “violently.” 
Both the ethical contortions and emotional register of ballistics scientists can 
be illustrated by returning to Fieser’s memoir. As already mentioned, during 
the Second World War, he was a leading expert in explosives and “hazardous 
chemicals,” known most notoriously for inventing napalm. Fieser titled his 
memoir The Scientific Method because he believed that, whether in peace or war, 
science proceeds by looking “for a clue or for a working hypothesis,” carrying 
out “experiments planned to exploit the clue or to test the hypothesis,” and then 
“carefully observ[ing] and analys[ing] the results.” This procedure is followed 
by planning “further experiments for advancement of the problem.”66 For him, 
Mechanism of High-Velocity Missiles,” British Medical Journal (December 20, 1941), 872. Also see 
J. Wilson, “Wound Ballistics,” West Journal of Medicine 127 (July 1977), 53. 
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there was no difference between devising weapons for military use (to which 
he devotes eighteen of twenty-three chapters) and making a “squirrel-proof bird 
feeder” (one chapter). Precision is crucial: Fieser’s text is strewn with chemical 
formulas, scientific acronyms, and detailed diagrams. Footnotes carefully provide 
readers with the academic qualifications of every person he mentions. He values 
“objective comparisons” and “objective appraisal,” and every component of his 
experiments are fastidiously calibrated, weighed, and assessed.67
But “objectivity” does not rule out emotion. Indeed, pleasure was the chief 
motive for writing his memoir in the first place. He wanted his book to “provide 
an entertaining and unorthodox demonstration of the scientific method.” He 
hoped that it would enable readers to “take pleasure, as I have, in recollecting 
stimulating experiments out of the past.”68 
For Fieser, inventing explosives involved an “exciting line of experimentation.”69 
He writes of “most impressive . . . performance[s],” which he eagerly photo-
graphs.70 He describes starting some “beautiful fires” in a way that was “a real 
pleasure.”71 Ballistics experiments are of “considerable personal interest,” lead-
ing rival scientists to engage in “competitions” with one another, after which they 
either celebrate or commiserate with one another in the “men’s bar.”72 After the 
successful testing of a “500-lb. incendiary bomb of penetration power superior 
to that of any existing bomb,” he simply exclaimed “Victory!” in his diary.73 
After using an incendiary on water, causing 40- to 50-foot-high flames along a 
1,000-gallon oil slick, he tells us that his team were “happy and we had a gay 
party of celebration in the evening.”74 Cute names were given to explosives, 
including “Slick Mix” (for “batches of dried goop” intended to ignite on water); 
“City Slicker” for a box igniter; and “Paul Revere” (after a prominent officer of 
the American Revolutionary War) for a munition designed to ignite on land or 
sea.75 When “released in clusters from a Torpedo Bomber,” “City Slickers” were 
“a pretty sight.”76 
Crucially, the effect of his weapons on his victims is totally absent. Fieser is 
obviously aware of the terrifyingly destructive power of his weapons on human 
beings. His incendiary experiments even involved constructing realistic settings, 
including homes with domestic furniture, wallpaper, and “pretty-girl picture[s]” 
hanging on the wall.77 It is no coincidence that his team laboriously reconstructed 
the straw tatami mats in traditional Japanese homes and even distinguished 
between the slate-like roofs in Rhenish homes compared with the tiles used 
in Hamburg; they never bothered to reproduce industrial buildings, suggesting 
that their targets all along were civilian. Nevertheless, he brags about the “most 
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impressive . . . performance” of phosphorus gel that when “extinguished with 
carbon dioxide or water” is capable of reigniting.78 He brags about the “500-lb 
‘goop’ bomb” and the “Napalm-filled gasoline drums and belly tanks which were 
used with great success in the Pacific area.”79 The M-69 bomb, he observed, was 
“used by the millions with devastating effect in Japan.”80 He boasted that many 
of the bombs carried “a charge of white phosphorus for production of a smoke 
screen to hamper fire fighting.”81 He was proud of the result, writing that “It is 
difficult to imagine what happens when 42 lbs. of burning gel is plastered all over 
the inside of a sturdy wooden barn: flames bursting out of the windows, blasting 
open the door, belching forth at the eaves and then through the roof. In a matter 
of minutes what remained of the structure collapsed into a burning heap.”82
Fieser had also been part of a plan to release thousands of bats carrying 
napalm-based incendiaries into “highly combustible Japanese houses at sites 
very favourable for starting fires.”83 After a detailed estimation of the thousands 
of fires these “bat bombs” would create, he asked “An attractive picture?,” reply-
ing “All those working on the project thought so.”84 In the end, the project was 
canceled, although Fieser commented that “the job was done very effectively by 
M-69s” nonetheless.85 His life-long pride in inventing the incendiary gel napalm 
led to him naming one of his beloved Siamese cats “J. G. Pooh,” which meant 
“Jellied Gasoline Pooh.”86 A charming photograph of this cat has pride of place 
in The Scientific Method.
Finally, violence is an essentially contested category in which some acts are 
included and others excluded. Ideological, political, and economic agents have 
categorized certain practices as “aggressive” and excluded others. Of course, the 
distance between ballistics scientists and “violence” did not always go unchal-
lenged. Indeed, at specific periods of history, the “violence” label was thrown at 
them. As we have seen, Fieser was forced to defend his creation (napalm)—albeit 
not after the Second World War but during the Vietnam conflict when Nick 
Ut’s 1972 photograph of Kim Phuc brought the horrors of this weapon to the 
American conscience. Other critics have attempted to destabilize the “dual use” 
arguments, placing greater emphasis on military medicine than on operational 
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Nevertheless, scientists engaged in war research have been remarkably suc-
cessful in avoiding connotations of violence. The science of wound ballistics 
involves researching, designing, and manufacturing weapons aimed at caus-
ing the most debilitating wounds in human and nonhuman animals, as well as 
destroying environments. However, the disconnect between their research activi-
ties and the outcomes on the battlefields can be summarized by a comment that 
prominent weapons designer Harvey made in 1943. He confessed that he “would 
not be interested in a casualty survey, either at the front or in hospitals in the 
USA, as this subject would be too distressing for me,” adding that “the theoretical 
aspects of wound ballistics, however, are very interesting.”89
In stark contrast to those who analyze weapons development as an objective 
science and who impart violent agency to autonomous technologies, I situate 
wound ballistics as a branch of applied moral philosophy. Its practice always 
involves an “ought.” Although the central job of ballistics scientists is the “effec-
tive production of wounds,” this is not regarded as violent, except to their vic-
tims, of course. In part, this lacuna is due to an ideological relationship forged 
between “violence” and particular emotional states: anger, for instance. Indeed, 
one of the main criticisms ballistics scientists expressed about their paymasters 
(that is, the armed forces) is that the latter were swayed by emotion. In contrast, 
these scientists orchestrated cool, instrumental violence. Education, gender, class, 
status, and whiteness were crucial in exempting them from any accusations of 
being violent men. 
At the start of this article, we heard Ridenour warn against “confus[ing] the 
rather minor matter of weapons design with the basic and tremendous immorality 
of war.”90 He advised readers to reject war, while continuing to devise its weap-
ons. Fieser, too, had only one word of condemnation for war in his book, where 
he complained about the extraordinary wastage of “many thousands of dollars” 
in weapons research programmes that later had to be scrapped. He then admitted 
that “War is gigantically wasteful, but that is only a minor charge that can be 
brought against the crime of war.”91 There are good reasons why he never tells 
readers what the “major charge” might be: it would undermine the entire point 
of his book, which was to extol both the intellectual and emotional pleasures of 
The Scientific Method. 
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